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FEDERALISM

■ ANALYSIS

- The New Russian-Tatar Treaty and Its Implications for Russian Federalism 2
By Julia Kusznir, Bremen

■ TABLES AND GRAPHS

- Tatarstan's Economy 6

■ ANALYSIS

- The Appointment of a New President in Adygeya and Trends in Relations Between the President and the Regions 7
By Oleg Tsvetkov, Maykop

■ STATISTICS

- An Overview of Russia's Regions 9

Analysis

The New Russian-Tatar Treaty and Its Implications for Russian Federalism

By Julia Kuszniir, Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen

Summary

When the Duma ratified a new bilateral treaty delimiting responsibilities between Russia's federal executive branch and the Republic of Tatarstan, the end of federal measures weakening the power of the regions seemed to be at hand. The treaty secured a number of important privileges dating back to the Yeltsin era for Tatarstan's regional elite. However, on February 25 the Federation Council, the upper house of the national parliament, rejected the bilateral treaty in unexpected fashion. The fallout from this decision is still unclear. But rare disagreement among Putin-era federal institutions highlights the current lack of a long-term concept for federal reforms. The present stalemate may mitigate open conflict between the center and the regions in the election period 2007–2008, but it will not help the federal government achieve the core task of its federal reform – the creation of stable, formal relations that are independent of individual clientelistic networks.

Securing Tatar Autonomy in the 1990s

In the early 1990s, the Russian regional political elites exploited the weakness of the federal center under President Boris Yeltsin to expand their own influence. Most importantly, they managed in the mid-1990s to enforce the election of regional political leaders by the population or – in a few cases – their appointment by the regional parliament. In this way, the regions selected their leaders independently of the federal center.

Additionally, some regions, with the Republic of Tatarstan in the lead, managed to negotiate special relations with the federal government. Talks between the Russian Federation (RF) and Tatarstan concluded on February 15, 1994 with the signing of a basic treaty on the delimitation of responsibilities between the executive organs of the two entities, in which the federal center confirmed the “special status” of this region. The treaty text called for it to remain in force for ten years. The regional political elite won *de facto* permission to act independently of the federal center. Subsequently, the Tatar government accrued additional responsibilities and authorities for itself. For example, it won the right to determine the personnel policies not only of the Tatar administration, but also of the federal agencies operating on its territory. Additional bilateral agreements between the center and Tatarstan gave the latter property rights to the republic's natural resources and real estate, as well as control over the regional industrial complex. The Tatar government thus disposed of the oil and natural gas extracted on its territory, and had the right to collect its own taxes as well as a large share of the export profits derived from these products. By introducing its own privatization vouchers and excluding regional companies from

federal auctions, Tatarstan's administration secured control of the regional economy. In early 2000, about 65 percent of the region's wealth was under the control of the governing political elite, which thus also constituted the region's economic elite.

The basic treaty of 1994 fostered increasing cooperation between the regional and federal governments. Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on an informal pact that provided for non-interference by the federal government in the politics of the region. On the other hand, it secured the regional administration's support for the Russian leadership, demonstrated by the strong results achieved by the federal pro-presidential party in Tatarstan in the national elections of 1995 and 1999.

The treaty became the paradigm for other regions, which also sought to win preferential treatment through bilateral negotiations with the center. At the same time, the federal government was able to prevent the regions from joining in collective bargaining over their interests. By July 1998, a total of 46 bilateral basic treaties had been signed between the center and the individual regions. Approximately 100 further bilateral treaties regulated specific aspects of mutual relations. Accordingly, Yeltsin's federalism spawned an unchecked deregulation of authority and gave rise to increasing differentiation between the regions.

Regional Power Relations in Tatarstan

The political confusion of 1993–4 gave Tatarstan President Shaimiev freedom of action in domestic affairs. On the one hand, he brought the ethno-national groups under his control. On the other, he excluded the democratic federal forces from the re-

gional political system. As a result, the regional elite was dominated both politically and economically by a group close to the republican president and his family. Close relatives and friends of the president were appointed to key positions in the regional administration and in local companies. About 90 percent of the regional elite was recruited from the Soviet *nomenklatura*, with 60 percent of top politicians even retaining the same positions that they already had during the Soviet era. According to a study of ruling groups in Tatarstan, ethnic Tatars made up 80 percent of the governing elite in 2003. The majority of ruling politicians was of rural descent, between 40 and 60 years old, and had completed a degree in higher education, mainly in the agricultural sector.

As a result, the region's political and economic actors alike are at least informally beholden to Shaimiev. His control over the regional administration's policies is largely unchallenged. Regional politics are based on informal networks that undermine the formal channels of decision-making without abolishing them altogether. The region's political elites benefit from their informal control of the economy, both in their role as representatives of the state, via tax revenues and their ability to shape the region's economic development, and personally, by securing power and financial enrichment for themselves. To this end, political actors take on functions in regional companies in order to steer them according to their own interests.

The highly personal, informal character of policy-making means that the formal significance of a position does not correspond to the true decision-making power of the incumbent. In this way, the key actors around Shaimiev have been able to accumulate a degree of authority that they are not formally entitled to, and to secure functions in other influential positions, such as in the business sector.

A good example is the regional petroleum industry, which is amalgamated under the vertically integrated Tatneft corporation. Tatneft played a key role in the conflict with the center over regional autonomy. With its annual production of 24 million tons of oil, the company is Russia's fifth-largest petroleum producer, contributing about 7.7 percent of the country's total output. About 50 percent of the regional budget's income consisted of tax revenues from the regional oil industry. The representatives of the regional administration hold a "Golden Share" that gives them a veto right in shareholder and board meetings, and the Tatar prime minister is the chairman of the board. By exerting direct control over the company's management, the regional administration directs Tatneft's corporate strategy.

In this way, Tatneft became an instrument of regional economic policy. For instance, the company profits were used to foster the regional economy, effectively forcing Tatneft to finance the regional budget and to subsidize parts of the regional economy, especially the agricultural sector that is home to the large majority of Tatar political elites. Furthermore, Tatneft profits were used to pay for and organize advertising campaigns for political organizations. At the same time, external economic actors that could not be controlled by the regional administration, including Russian oil major Lukoil, were prevented from accessing the Tatar market.

Putin's Federal Reform

Starting in 2000, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin inaugurated a policy that aimed primarily to weaken the position of the governors, taking away many of their powers and forcing the regions into submission to the federal government. The first step, begun in early 2000, was the adjustment of regional laws to bring them into accordance with higher-standing federal law. In the course of this process, many of the privileges enjoyed by the regions were overturned, since they violated federal law. The bilateral treaties between the center and the regions were also largely abolished. Between 2001 and 2002, 28 bilateral treaties were annulled. As a result of changes to the federal law regulating the organization of the regions' legislative and executive branches in 2003, the remaining bilateral treaties lost their power. Since then, new bilateral agreements between the federal center and the regions have been subject to approval by the national parliament. As a result no bilateral treaties are in force at the moment.

The next step towards strengthening the position of the center at the expense of the regions was the reorganization of the Federation Council in June 2000, ending the direct participation of the governors in the political processes at the federal level. Among the further steps towards restricting regional autonomy were the establishment of seven new federal districts and the granting of wide-ranging, though vaguely defined, authority to the president's envoys in these districts. In September 2004, the political role of the governors was further curtailed; they are now appointed directly by the president, while regional parliaments only confirm their appointment.

Putin's economic reforms further restricted the regions' freedom of action. The new federal tax and budget codes adopted in Putin's first term transferred considerable regional authority to the federal center. Regional tax revenues were cut back. The

regional branches of federal agencies such as the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, and the Tax Ministry were unequivocally subordinated to central power. Furthermore, the governors were relieved of their power to create special economic zones. Following further changes in federal law, the regions are also expected to lose their right to participate in issuing licenses for the extraction of natural resources.

As a result, all Russian regions have lost part of their political and economic capability to act. Tatarstan was also forced to give up part of its special status under pressure from the federal center. Since the adaptation of Tatar law to the superordinate federal legislation, the regional administration has lost a broad range of privileges. In the course of these measures, the preferential treatment enjoyed by Tatneft was also heavily criticized by the federal authorities. Several regional laws on licensing and taxing the petroleum industry were subsequently abolished.

Federal efforts to gain control over the regional oil sector met with strong resistance on the part of the regional political elites, who were keen to retain guarantees of independence for the regional administration as well as favorable regulations for the regional petroleum industry. They signaled their determination to provoke an escalation of the conflict if their demands were rejected. After several personal meetings between Shaimiev and Putin, the regional administration managed to retain a certain degree of independence from the federal center for its political elites. Ultimately, a compromise solution was found with the federal center. The center declared that it was prepared to extend the bilateral treaty of 1994, thereby confirming Tatarstan's special status within the Federation. This outcome was achieved despite the fact that parts of the treaty were declared to be unconstitutional. At the same time, Tatarstan had to remove a number of regional laws which contradicted federal legislation. Ultimately, the Tatarstan legislature made 357 amendments to the regional constitution, which was adopted as a new constitution in April 2002.

The basis of the informal agreement between Yeltsin and Shaimiev was essentially preserved under Putin. On the one hand, the Tatar regional administration supports the new party of power, United Russia, which is close to Putin; Shaimiev even joined the party, becoming co-chairman of the party's Supreme Soviet. Shaimiev's backing guaranteed that the party would formally dominate regional politics. In the 2003 State Duma elections, it received 60 percent of the votes – its best showing in the Russian regions. On the other hand, the internal structure of power in Tatarstan, which was tailored for Shaimiev, remained

largely intact. The federal center therefore accepts the regional constellation of elites and thus the continued dominance of the Shaimiev clan in regional politics and business.

Securing a New Treaty

In order to formalize the relationship with the center, Tatarstan sought to sign a new bilateral treaty. Accordingly, in October 2005 the Tatar parliament approved a new text for the agreement. In early November 2006, President Putin introduced the draft treaty to the lower house of the Russian parliament. The Duma, in which the United Russia party possesses a large majority, approved the treaty on February 22, 2007. Despite public statements to the contrary, the new ten-year bilateral treaty grants Tatarstan a series of benefits concerning economic and political issues that are of importance to the republic. Not only would Tatarstan retain control over the regional economy, but the regional administration also would have the right to determine taxation levels for the petroleum industry independent of the federal government. At the political level, allowances are made for Tatar ethno-nationalism. For example, the candidates proposed by the Russian president for the office of the republic's presidency must speak the Tatar language, which effectively precludes the nomination of an outsider from Moscow.

However, on February 25 the Federation Council rejected the bilateral treaty. Each of the Russian regions has two representatives in this house and it is dominated by the Just Russia party, the second "political project" of the Kremlin, created as a Kremlin-friendly opposition party to United Russia. The Federation Council found certain points of the treaty unconstitutional and a threat to the existence of the Federation. Shaimiev responded with scathing criticism. He stressed that this was a political decision which signaled that the electoral campaigns of 2007 and 2008 had already begun. He added that United Russia now had a greater chance of winning the elections in Tatarstan. Spokesmen for United Russia also described the decision as a political mistake because it sought to weaken the position of both President Putin and their party. They suggested a change of the rules governing the composition of the Federal Council in order to avoid such situations in the future.

Conclusion

There are two scenarios for the future. In the first, the treaty will be sent to the Duma for amendment. The veto of the Federation Council can be overturned if the Duma passes the law on the treaty with

a two-thirds majority and sends it directly on to the president. The president could then ignore the Federation Council and sign the law.

In this case the bilateral treaty between the center and Tatarstan would mark the first instance under Putin when a region was able to win explicit legal affirmation for its special status. It would remain to be seen whether other regions would follow. The representatives of the federal government have, however, signaled that there will be no more cases of exceptional treatment. To prove this point, the Russian government turned down a similar request by the president of the Republic of Bashkortostan, which marked the tenth anniversary of its bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation a few months ago.

Nevertheless, it is very likely that the Russian government will in fact sign a bilateral treaty with the Chechen Republic, which is an exception among the Russian regions in so far as it has failed to reach any kind of agreement with the federal executive on the respective areas of jurisdiction. Before the referendum ratifying the Chechen constitution in 2003, Putin promised the republic a high level of autonomy. Preparations for a bilateral treaty, which were only begun during the government of Akhmad Kadyrov, were interrupted at his death in 2004, and have regained importance since his son Ramzan Kadyrov became prime minister of the republic. The Chechen government has drawn up a draft law granting Chechnya the status of a sovereign republic. This would include a number of privileges, for example the right to administer independently the raw materials in the region and the income made from them, including revenue from the sale of oil. Kadyrov's appointment as Chechen president in February 2007 will add weight to this process.

According to the second scenario, there will be no new bilateral treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan. In this way, the Kremlin could end the negotiations on preferential treatment for regions without direct intervention, blaming the struggle between the parties and the two chambers of parliament. This scenario would help to avoid open conflict between the center and the regions with its

negative political consequences in the regional and federal elections of 2007–2008. Likewise, the lack of a treaty would mean that the period of bilateral relations between the federal center and the Russian regions was at an end.

In the course of incremental federal reforms, Russian President Putin has increasingly cut back the regional political elites' freedom of action since 2000 and has relieved them of the authority to make decisions on key personnel issues as well as economic policy. However, the case of Tatarstan clearly illustrates that many governors are still able to play a decisive role in Russian politics despite the considerable loss of formal responsibilities. In particular, they are able to act as informal mediators in the event of conflicts between regional elite groups or between the region and the center. In this context, the influence of the governors over the regional media, business elite, party branches, and parliaments is of great significance.

Conversely, thanks to the governors' power, the federal center cannot challenge the constellation of regional elites. This is not only true of Tatarstan, but constitutes a general trend in Russian federalism, as can be seen in the fact that since acquiring the authority to appoint the governors, President Putin has in most cases renominated the incumbent. The difference compared to the Yeltsin era, which was perceived by the federal political elites themselves as "chaotic", lies in the balance of power, not in the rules of the game.

It is accordingly justified to regard the new federal order as being personally dependent on President Putin himself. A weakening of the federal center would inevitably lead to a resurgence of the regions. On the other hand, there has not been a serious attempt to achieve the central purpose of the federal reform, namely the establishment of stable and formalized relations that are independent of individuals. The hallmarks of Russian federalism identified by many scholars during the 1990s – asymmetry and instability – therefore remain. But because of the power shift in the interim, the federal political elites feel less threatened by the current level of asymmetry and instability.

Translated from the German by Christopher Findlay


About the author

Julia Kusznir is a researcher at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen. Her doctoral thesis is entitled "The political influence of economic elites in the Russian regions, 1992–2005. An analysis based on the examples of the oil and gas industries", and includes a case study of Tatarstan.

Tables and Graphs

Tatarstan's Economy


Tatarstan's Five Biggest Companies



Tatneft: oil industry
KamAZ: automobile industry
Nizhnekamskneftekhim: petrochemicals
Tatenergo: electricity
Nizhnekamskshina: petrochemicals


Source: Company database of the Russian journal Ekspert, 9–15 November 2006

Structure of Tatarstan's Industry



Source: www.tatar.ru

Tatarstan's exports by product (in mln. USD)



Source: Regional Statistical Office of Tatarstan, www.tatstat.ru

Analysis

The Appointment of a New President in Adygeya and Trends in Relations Between the President and the Regions

By Oleg Tsvetkov, Maykop

Summary

The Kremlin's appointment of Aslancherii Tkhakushinov as the new president of Adygeya is unprecedented since the new leader won only 2 percent of the vote in the region's last presidential elections in 2002. The appointment shows that Moscow is much more concerned with naming a dependent, manageable regional leader than one who represents the will of regional society. The result could be damaging for Russia since now the bureaucratic class is taking power far beyond the control of civil oversight.

Putin Appoints a New President

Despite its specific features, the case of Adygeya, a North Caucasus republic with a population of 450,000, demonstrates the logic of the Kremlin's federal policy: strengthen the dependence of the regions on Moscow and subordinate them to its current interests. This is why Putin cancelled the gubernatorial election in 2004 and replaced them with presidential appointments.

Putin appointed Tkhakushinov, the former rector of the Maykop State Technical University, despite his poor showing in 2002 and his shady reputation. During a meeting with Putin on December 7, 2006, former Adygeya President Khazret Sovmen named Tkhakushinov as one of the "thieves, bandits, and extortionists" running the republic according to the republican press, citing sources at Radio Liberty and the Internet (<http://www.rambler.ru/news/politics/0/9318393.html>). The university that Tkhakushinov led has a reputation for taking bribes. Many students there claim that they paid to enter the university and continue to pay to pass tests. Such practices are not uncommon in the Russian education system.

Useful Friends

Tkhakushinov benefited from connections to many highly-placed friends. Since Putin does not know all the regional elite and lacks the ability to pick among them, he must choose governors from the candidates suggested to him. Usually his advisors remain in the shadows and it is difficult to determine their exact role.

At his inauguration on January 13, Tkhakushinov named Deputy Head of the FSB Investigative Department Yury Ansimov as his personal friend. Currently Ansimov serves in Moscow, but formerly was head of the FSB in Adygeya.

In Adygeya, Ansimov was also connected to Vladimir Altunin, with whom he wrote a book on ter-

rorism. Since the summer of 2006, Altunin has served as the federal inspector for Adygeya on the staff of the Presidential Envoy to Southern Russia Dmitry Kozak. Now Altunin sits next to Tkhakushinov at official events, occupying a seat of honor and power. Former President Sovmen, in contrast, did not have any contact with him.

Tkhakushinov used a variety of means to make contact with highly placed federal officials. In the summer of 2006, his university set up a branch of the Academy of Security, Law, and Order, an organization that unites many former and current employees of the special services and law enforcement agencies that asserts its close ties to Putin. Tkhakushinov welcomed the head of the republican FSB, procurator, and one of the deputy ministers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Academy. Two months later he awarded them orders from the Academy. He also made them honorary professors.

Tkhakushinov made contact with many people from Putin's administration in 2004. Then he worked on Putin's presidential campaign as a "trusted official," a position only possible with good connections. Tkhakushinov never let an opportunity pass to make contacts. As a result, various members of the law enforcement agencies, federal and regional officials, parliamentarians, their wives and children have all held various positions at the university.

Personal contacts are extremely important in Russian politics and the quickest lift for advancing one's career. But Tkhakushinov also had party and social support built for him by federal party and state bureaucrats.

Organization of Party Support

In the second half of 2006, the Kremlin-controlled United Russia party officially recommended Tkhakushinov as Adygeya president. However, the recommendation only came after the party's Moscow organization intervened. The local party organization

had to accept Tkhakushinov as its candidate although earlier it had not considered him for this position.

Initially, the republican branch of the party backed Sovmen, the incumbent president and Aslan Khashir, one of Adygeya's representatives to the Federation Council. After meeting with Kozak, the party added Ruslan Khadzhebiekov, chairman of the republican parliament and leader of Adygeya's United Russia party.

Several days later, the Moscow leadership of the party met and proposed Tkhakushinov. On October 19, Andrei Vorob'ev, head of the United Russia Executive Committee and a State Duma member, came to Maykop and chaired a meeting of the party's political council, which finally nominated Tkhakushinov. It is not clear why the Moscow leadership decided to overrule local preferences.

Building Social Support

The cancellation of gubernatorial elections means that Kremlin bureaucrats must simulate the public support that the candidates they prepare presumably have. It is not hard to do this since there are a large number of social organizations that take orders from the authorities. Kozak arrived in Maykop to carry out this work. The main intrigue here was how Kozak's staff compiled the list of organizations that would be allowed to meet with him. Mostly this group consisted of organizations that were known supporters of Tkhakushinov.

These groups are dependent on state subsidies. They realized that the Kremlin had already decided to jettison Sovmen. They also realized that Sovmen still had a chance to return to power. As a result, they all began their speeches by thanking Sovmen and then continued with the formulation "if Sovmen were suddenly to depart," "then I would support Tkhakushinov."

Building Support in the Regional Parliament

Adygeya's legislature had to make an about face in supporting Tkhakushinov. In the beginning of October 2006, there was no support for his candidacy, but he won a nearly unanimous vote by December. The sharp change came after the federal and regional United Russia party leaders announced their new positions. When United Russia called a test vote on Tkhakushinov on October 25, 46 of 54 deputies voted for him. The voting was held in the open, so it was obvious how each member voted. A motion to vote in secret did not pass. Sovmen issued a statement saying that the voting was illegitimate, but there was little he could do. Finally on December 13, the legis-

lature held its final vote and Tkhakushinov won with 50 of a possible 54 votes.

Weak Opposition from the Former President

Sovmen could do little to block the election of Tkhakushinov once the federal authorities had decided to back him. During his tenure he had often insulted Putin's presidential envoys, various siloviki, and other federal bureaucrats. But ultimately he realized that he was in an extremely weak position and handed over the presidency.

One strength that Sovmen did have was the backing of the Adyge Khase, which united the ethnic Adygs in the republic. The Adygs make up about 25 percent of the population, while Russians are about 65 percent. The Adyge Khase saw Sovmen as protecting the ethnic interests of the republic, in particular, preventing a merger of Adygeya with the much larger Krasnodar Krai. Tkhakushinov's position on the merger was unclear. Ultimately, however, neither Sovmen's ethnic backing nor his control of much of the local media proved decisive.

First Steps of the New President

Tkhakushinov's first steps in office show that the Kremlin now has a compliant regional leader. He ended the ethnic Adyg monopoly on all the top offices in the republic and greatly increased the representation of ethnic Russians, a move that the Kremlin had long sought. In February Tkhakushinov accompanied Putin on a trip to Jordan, where he met with local Adygs (Cherkess) and helping the president deal with awkward questions from these people who seek easier ways of becoming Russian citizens.

Tkhakushinov also raised the status of federal bureaucrats in the republic. If Sovmen treated them with contempt, Tkhakushinov now seats them in places of honor in a wide variety of meetings.

However, although the Kremlin now formally has a loyal leader, it is in danger of weakening its real control over the republic rather than strengthening it. Experience shows that many federal bureaucrats working in the regions are likely to form behind-the-scenes alliances with the regional elite rather than their federal superiors. They have many common interests with the regional elite: shadow business, finding employment for themselves and their relatives, educating their children, obtaining comfortable housing, and a host of other issues. The best way to realize these goals is to work with the regional elite.

Tkhakushinov is very effective at developing ties with federal officials and most likely will work in that

direction. For example, he, and not the Russian procurator general, asked the republican procurator to figure out who owns which property in the republic. The procurator of course said nothing with the Diamant firm let Tkhakushinov use an expensive car for his purposes.

For the federal government, Tkhakushinov's main task will be to round up votes for the 2008 presidential election. In other spheres, the new leader will have a free hand. Tellingly, the federal government did not even draw up a list of tasks for the new republican president to perform.

Conclusions

The process of naming a new republican leader shows that there are high risks of corruption at each step of the way. Cancelling governors' elections means that those seeking this office have changed the focus of their activities. Instead of seeking the support of the electorate, they now vie for the backing of bureaucrats who can influence the president's choice. The extensive corruption in this process now could have catastrophic consequences for the country.

Having achieved relative stability in the North Caucasus, the Kremlin is now interested in "successfully" conducting the 2007 State Duma and 2008

presidential elections. For this it needs obedient regional leaders and access to their administrative resources.

If this is the federal plan, it is deeply mistaken. Rejecting radical improvement of the situation in the North Caucasus and fighting corruption means that the region will drop farther into a "gray zone." The existing problems will be exacerbated and the chances of instability increase. The current model of federalism, in which the Kremlin appoints regional leaders loyal to it, is leading to a dead end. The situation in Adygeya and other regions where Kremlin-appointees rule shows that federalism is becoming a fiction. The development of a tradition of rational administration and civic associations is being put off to an indeterminate future.

Instead, Russia is building a form of "contract federalism" in which the parties to the agreement are not the region and the center, but regional leaders, conditionally appointed by the Kremlin, and the Kremlin itself. The two sides easily sidestep constitutional and legal limitations. Ordinary citizens are pushed to the edge of this behind-the-scenes game. And Russian state power is increasingly turning into a monopoly of the ruling bureaucratic class, working beyond civil oversight.

About the author

Oleg Tsvetkov is a senior researcher in the Social-Political Problems Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Southern Scientific Center.

Statistics


An Overview of Russia's Regions

The Russian Federation originally consisted of 89 subjects of the federation (*subyekty federatsii*), commonly known as the "regions" (*regiony*). As of January 2007 six regions had merged, bringing the total number of regions down to 86. Brief statistical profiles of these 86 regions are given in the graphs and tables below.


Of the present 86 regions, 49 carry the official name *oblast* (in English also translated as "region"); 21 are republics (*respublika*); 7 are autonomous districts (*avtonomny okrug*); six are territories (*krai*); two – Moscow and St. Petersburg – are federal cities (*gorod federal'no znacheniya*), and one is an autonomous region (*avtonomnaya oblast*). The regions are grouped into seven federal districts. The federal districts are shown on the map included after the following graphs and tables.

By next year two further regions will cease to exist. On July 1, 2007, Kamchatka Region and Koryaksky Autonomous District will merge to form Kamchatka territory. On January 1, 2008, Ust-Ordynsky Buryatsky Autonomous District will become part of Irkutsk Region.


Russia's 10 Biggest Regions by Territory ('000 km²)



Russia's 10 Biggest Regions by Population (in mln.)



Russia's 10 Biggest Regions by GDP (Share in Total Russian GDP)



Russia's 10 Regions with the Highest Average Monthly Income Per Capita (in USD)




Table: Russia's Regions. An Overview of Main Statistical Indicators

Region	Capital	Territory (‘000 km ²)	Population (in mln.)	Share in Russian GDP	Average monthly income per capita (in USD)
For comparison: Russia	Moscow	17 098	142.8	100%	276
<i>Central Federal District</i>	<i>Moscow</i>				
Belgorod Region	Belgorod	27	1.5	0.8%	183
Bryansk Region	Bryansk	35	1.3	0.4%	166
Vladimir Region	Vladimir	29	1.5	0.5%	140
Voronezh Region	Voronezh	52	2.3	0.8%	185
Ivanovo Region	Ivanovo	21	1.1	0.3%	118
Kaluga Region	Kaluga	30	1.0	0.4%	186
Kostroma Region	Kostroma	60	0.7	0.3%	164
Kursk Region	Kursk	30	1.2	0.6%	179
Lipetsk Region	Lipetsk	24	1.2	1.0%	192
Moscow Region	Moscow	46	6.6	3.8%	251
Oryol Region	Oryol	25	0.8	0.4%	163
Ryazan Region	Ryazan	40	1.2	0.5%	161
Smolensk Region	Smolensk	50	1.0	0.4%	188
Tambov Region	Tambov	35	1.1	0.4%	180
Tver Region	Tver	84	1.4	0.6%	191
Tula Region	Tula	26	1.6	0.6%	171
Yaroslavl Region	Yaroslavl	36	1.3	0.8%	209
Moscow city	Moscow city	1	10.4	19.0%	863
<i>Northwestern Federal District</i>	<i>St. Petersburg</i>				
Republic of Karelia	Petrozavodsk	181	0.7	0.4%	236
Republic of Komi	Syktvykar	417	1.0	1.0%	386
Arkhangelsk Region	Arkhangelsk	590	1.3	1.1%	265
Nenets Autonomous District	Naryan Mar	177	0.04	0.3%	469
Vologda Region	Vologda	145	1.2	1.1%	227
Kaliningrad Region	Kaliningrad	15	0.9	0.5%	219
Leningrad Region	St. Petersburg	84	1.6	1.2%	196
Murmansk Region	Murmansk	145	0.9	0.8%	352
Novgorod Region	Novgorod	55	0.7	0.3%	179
Pskov Region	Pskov	55	0.7	0.3%	170
St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg	1	4.6	3.6%	423
<i>Southern Federal District</i>	<i>Rostov-on-Don</i>				
Republic of Adygeya	Maykop	8	0.4	0.1%	132
Republic of Dagestan	Makhachkala	50	2.6	0.5%	165
Republic of Ingushetia	Nazran	4	0.5	0.04%	85
Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria	Nalchik	13	0.9	0.2%	140
Republic of Kalmykia	Elista	75	0.3	0.1%	82
Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia	Cherkessk	14	0.4	0.1%	146
Republic of North Ossetia	Vladikavkaz	8	0.7	0.2%	182
Republic of Chechnya	Grozny	16	1.2	na	na

Region	Capital	Territory (‘000 km ²)	Population (in mln.)	Share in Russian GDP	Average monthly income per capita (in USD)
Krasnodar Territory	Krasnodar	76	5.1	2.2%	189
Stavropol Territory	Stavropol	66	2.7	0.9%	178
Astrakhan Region	Astrakhan	49	1.0	0.4%	197
Volgograd Region	Volgograd	113	2.6	1.1%	198
Rostov Region	Rostov on Don	101	4.3	1.5%	220
<i>Volga Federal District</i>	<i>Nizhny Novgorod</i>				
Republic of Bashkortostan	Ufa	143	4.1	2.3%	226
Republic of Marii-El	Yoshkar-Ola	23	0.7	0.2%	116
Republic of Mordovia	Saransk	26	0.9	0.4%	140
Republic of Tatarstan	Kazan	68	3.8	2.8%	244
Republic of Udmurtia	Izhevsk	42	1.5	0.7%	156
Republic of Chuvashia	Cheboksary	18	1.3	0.4%	139
Perm territory	Perm	160	2.7	1.8%	275
Kirov Region	Vyatka	120	1.4	0.5%	156
Nizhny Novgorod Region	Nizhny Novgorod	77	3.4	1.8%	209
Orenburg Region	Orenburg	124	2.1	1.2%	172
Penza Region	Penza	43	1.4	0.4%	145
Samara Region	Samara	54	3.2	2.4%	316
Saratov Region	Saratov	101	2.6	1.1%	169
Ulyanovsk Region	Ulyanovsk	37	1.3	0.5%	155
<i>Urals Federal District</i>	<i>Yekaterinburg</i>				
Kurgan Region	Kurgan	72	1.0	0.3%	161
Sverdlovsk Region	Yekaterinburg	194	4.4	2.5%	296
Tyumen Region	Tyumen	1 464	3.3	13.0%	497
Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous District	Khanty-Mansiisk	535	1.5	8.8%	600
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District	Salekhard	769	0.5	2.9%	736
Chelyabinsk Region	Chelyabinsk	89	3.5	2.1%	225
<i>Siberian Federal District</i>	<i>Novosibirsk</i>				
Republic of Altai	Gorno-Ataysk	93	0.2	0.1%	153
Republic of Buryatia	Ulan-Ude	351	1.0	0.4%	203
Republic of Tyva	Kyzyl	169	0.3	0.1%	141
Republic of Khakasia	Abakan	62	0.5	0.2%	171
Altai Territory	Barnaul	168	2.5	0.8%	157
Krasnoyarsk Territory	Krasnoyarsk	2 367	2.9	2.6%	266
Irkutsk Region	Irkutsk	775	2.5	1.4%	245
Ust-Ordynsky Buryatsky Autonomous District	Ust-Ordynsky	22	0.1	0.03%	76
Kemerovo Region	Kemerovo	96	2.8	1.8%	268
Novosibirsk Region	Novosibirsk	178	2.6	1.4%	219
Omsk Region	Omsk	141	2.0	1.4%	241
Tomsk Region	Tomsk	314	1.0	1.0%	275
Chita Region	Chita	432	1.1	0.4%	197
Aginsk Buryat Autonomous District	Aginskoe	20	0.07	0.02%	176

Region	Capital	Territory (‘000 km ²)	Population (in mln.)	Share in Russian GDP	Average monthly income per capita (in USD)
<i>Far Eastern Federal District</i>	<i>Khabarovsk</i>				
Republic of Sakha – Yakutia	Yakutsk	3 084	0.9	1.1%	383
Primorsky Territory	Vladivostok	165	2.0	1.0%	246
Khabarovsk Territory	Khabarovsk	788	1.4	0.9%	318
Amur Region	Blagoveshchensk	362	0.9	0.5%	212
Kamchatka Region	Petro-Kamchatsky	464	0.3	0.2%	337
Koryaksky Autonomous District	Palana	293	0.02	0.03%	308
Magadan Region	Magadan	463	0.2	0.2%	380
Sakhalin Region	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	87	0.5	0.6%	417
Jewish Autonomous Region	Birobidzhan	36	0.2	0.1%	218
Chukotka Autonomous District	Anadyr	722	0.05	0.1%	453

Source: Russian Federal Service for Statistics (Rosstat): *Rossiya v tsifrakh 2006*, Moscow 2006, pp. 40–47.



About the Russian Analytical Digest

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Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982 and led by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Eichwede, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the former socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist societies, since January 2007 a group of international research institutes is participating in a collaborative project on the theme "The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in culture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history", which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and identity formation. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email service with more than 10,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

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The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public.

The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center's research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.

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