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## Analysis

# Can Russia's Opposition Liberals Come to Power?

By Robert W. Orttung, Washington

## Abstract

Theoretically, Russia's opposition liberals could come to power through elections or cooperating with the incumbent authorities. Currently, liberals have little leverage in the elite battles taking place at the top of Russian politics. The only elections with some competition left are at the local level and Boris Nemtsov produced a respectable showing in the April Sochi mayoral elections, though the regime is still able to squash any conceivable opposition. Pursuing an alternative strategy, Nikita Belykh recently accepted an appointment as Kirov governor and is trying to show that his liberal ideology will work in practice, even in extremely unfavorable conditions. While the Yabloko party continues to exist under new leadership, it has not found a strong place under contemporary conditions. Although the liberals have little chance of coming to power at the federal level today, they are building experience in campaigning and governing that could be useful if an opportunity opens in the future.

## Two Paths to Power

There are two ways that Russia's opposition liberals could conceivably come to power in contemporary Russia: elections or cooperation with the Putin regime. With elections, a liberal candidate and party would compete with other parties and win popular support. By working with the Putin regime, opposition liberals could cooperate with the current authorities to advance their ideological goals. The following article will examine the chances for these two paths.

In this context, liberals are individuals and parties that support a coherent ideology which includes support for a democratic form of government (free elections, free press, a meaningful legislature, independent judges) and a relatively circumscribed role for the state in the economy. In post-Soviet Russia, a variety of groups have expressed this ideology, including Democratic Russia, Yabloko, Russia's Democratic Choice, Union of Right Forces, and, most recently, Solidarity. Yegor Gaidar's government in 1991–1992 marked the height of liberal power in Russia. Liberal parties had representation in the State Duma until the December 2003 elections, when both the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko failed to cross the 5 percent barrier. With the 2007 elections, held under strict proportional representation rules that allowed in only parties that won more than 7 percent of the vote, the few prominent liberal individuals remaining in the lower house of the legislature lost their seats.

## Olympic Electoral Efforts

While national elections provide few opportunities for opposition parties to win political representation, mayoral elections have offered alternative candidates

a chance to present their views and challenge incumbents. Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders of the newly formed Solidarity opposition movement, saw the April 26 elections in Sochi as an opportunity to boost the profile of his movement and test the potential for liberal views in Russia.

Sochi will host the winter Olympics in 2014 so the mayor of the city will be a figure of national and international prominence. Seeking to win an election there for an opposition candidate like Nemtsov was a highly visible test since Putin takes a strong personal interest in the progress of Olympic preparations and would not want to have someone he did not control in the position of mayor. Ultimately, Nemtsov won just 13.5 percent of the vote and did not pose a serious threat to the authorities' chosen candidate who won 77 percent. The Communist Party candidate won a meager 7 percent, in an election in which 39 percent of the eligible voters participated. Immediately following the election, Nemtsov claimed that his exit polls showed him winning as much as 35 percent of the vote and he has filed a legal case arguing that the authorities engaged in massive falsifications.

Interpreting the significance of Nemtsov's official numbers is difficult. On one hand, he did not come close to beating the incumbent. However, a second place showing of 13.5 percent suggests that the liberal cause is in better shape than it has been in recent years. In the 2007 State Duma elections, the liberal parties combined won only 2.6 percent of the vote. If Nemtsov can build a national coalition that would bring him to 13.5 percent of the vote at the national level, he would dramatically improve the recent performance of co-believers.

It is not clear that Nemtsov could do on the national level what he accomplished in Sochi. The dominant figure in Sochi is the governor of Krasnodar Krai Aleksandr Tkachev. Although technically serving at the will of the Russian president, Tkachev maintains Moscow's support by holding his region in a tight vice. As governor, he controls all the mayors working in his region and their "elections" simply ratify decisions that he made long in advance. Sochi held elections now because the governor had won the appointment of a previous Sochi mayor as head of Olimpstroy, the state corporation in charge of Olympic preparations. Tkachev apparently was not happy with two subsequent individuals who sat in the mayor's chair and finally settled on Anatoly Pakhomov as the best man for the job. To secure Pakhomov's victory, the authorities used every dirty trick in the book: first registering a porn star, ballerina, and oligarch to turn the election into a circus, then removing them when they seemed likely to damage Pakhomov's chances of winning more than 50 percent in the first round and avoiding a runoff. They apparently calculated that removing Nemtsov from the race would cause them too much embarrassment, so they let him compete. Nevertheless, the local authorities held tight control over the media, using it to build up acting Mayor Pakhomov's image as a pragmatic leader who gets things down, while regularly attacking Nemtsov, accusing him, for example, of "selling the Olympics to the Koreans" and "working for the Americans."

Cut off from media access and up against municipal leaders bent on using every conceivable resource against him, Nemtsov built his campaign on grassroots organizing. He spent the weeks before the election running around the city trying to meet with as many voters as possible face-to-face and convincing them to vote for him, as documented in Campaign Manager Ilya Yashin's blog (<http://yashin.livejournal.com/>). In addition, Nemtsov set himself up as the defender of ordinary Sochi residents who saw themselves as victims of the Olympic construction plans. Preparing for the 2014 games requires extensive infrastructure construction, which will force many people out of their homes. Numerous property owners do not want to move and feel that they are not being offered sufficient compensation, creating considerable discontent. Nemtsov was able to tap into these concrete concerns and present himself as a defender of popular interests in the face of an indifferent government.

Whether Nemtsov and his allies will be able to apply similar tactics at the national level remains an open question. With federal media under strict control, the liber-

als will have to find a different way to get their message out. Meeting with people face-to-face will not be as easy at the national level in a country as large as Russia as it was in a city like Sochi. Additionally, it may be harder for the liberals to find a concrete cause at the national level as the Olympics provided in Sochi. Accordingly, it is by no means easy to extrapolate Nemtsov's Sochi results to the federal level.

### Cooperating with the Authorities?

The key question for Russia's liberal opposition groups is whether or not they should cooperate with the Putin regime. This question has long divided members of the movement. In the first part of Putin's presidency, the liberals generally supported him, but now the movement is much more divided. Supporters of working with the authorities point out that doing so gives liberals access to real power, including chances to win Russian elections, and makes it possible for them to influence policies. Opponents protest that subordinating themselves to the will of the Kremlin causes them to give up their identity, blocking them from achieving substantive gains on core matters such as promoting democracy and competitive markets.

After its disastrous showing in the 2007 State Duma elections, the Union of Right Forces, once a key leader of the liberal movement, officially disbanded and broke into three different camps. Nemtsov and colleagues like chess champion Garri Kasparov, human rights activist Lev Ponomarev and former Deputy Energy Minister Vladimir Milov set up Solidarity in October 2008 as a party in opposition to Russia's authoritarian regime (<http://www.rusolidarnost.ru/>). The group seeks to organize mass activities in order to pressure the authorities to take real steps toward the democratization of the country. It is working for free and fair parliamentary elections in which all sides have equal access to the media. The group's program "300 Steps to Freedom" proposes 300 concrete measures that should be adopted to advance liberal goals. Overall, the program seeks to establish greater competition in Russia's political and economic life.

Another fragment of the SPS joined with two smaller parties to form Right Cause (*Pravoe delo*, <http://www.pravoedelo.ru/>). This organization, headed by former acting SPS leader Leonid Gozman, journalist Georgii Bovt, and Business Russia Chairman Boris Titov, is closely associated with the Kremlin and is basically an attempt by the authorities to bring right-wing voters into a group that they can easily control, while siphoning off potential support from authentic opposition groups like

Solidarity. Gozman justified establishing a new “liberal” party under Kremlin auspices by commenting that “it is impossible to create a party without cooperating with the authorities under the existing totalitarian regime.” The party’s compromises with Russia’s rulers are obvious in its slogan “freedom, property, order.” The purpose of *Pravoe delo* is to bring the right into the political mainstream, according to a 2009 history of the Union of Right Forces written by the Kirill Benediktov (<http://red-viper.livejournal.com/54915.html>). This book, published under the general editorship of pro-Kremlin spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky, seems to be, among other things, a sophisticated attempt to make *Pravoe delo* appear to be more important than it actually is, though the author admits that the party has little chance of winning over Russian business, which is now focused on courting the pro-Kremlin United Russia since it sees that party as providing more reliable access to the corridors of power.

Former SPS Chairman Nikita Belykh (<http://belykh.livejournal.com/>) chose a different route. After the break-up of the Union of Right Forces, Belykh declared that he would not join the newly-created Right Cause because he did not want to participate in a “Kremlin project.” He also came into conflict with Solidarity leader Kasparov. Instead of continuing to work within these various party organizations, Belykh accepted the surprising offer from President Medvedev to become governor of Kirov Oblast, one of the poorest regions in Russia, which is facing particularly intractable problems during times of general economic crisis. Naturally, many of his party colleagues considered Belykh’s decision to accept the governorship a sell-out to the authorities, but he claimed that he was not giving up his convictions and that he would put his skills to work addressing practical issues.

Like Nemtsov’s effort to win an election in a city where Putin has a personal stake, Belykh is seeking to prove himself in a job where he has little chance of success. Nevertheless, if Belykh, who is just 33, can prove himself in Kirov, it may open doors for him at the federal level and pave the way for more liberal politicians to gain more important positions. During his first months in office, Belykh has sought to improve business conditions, cut the size of the bureaucracy at the regional level, fight corruption and the organized theft of forest products, build new housing, and reach out to foreign investors, a strategy that paid dividends in Novgorod under Mikhail Prusak and Nizhny Novgorod under Nemtsov. But the challenges will be extreme as he faces budget deficits, declining output from local factories, growing

wage arrears, and poor infrastructure, particularly inadequate roads. Belykh has brought in young activists, such as Maria Gaidar (<http://m-gaidar.livejournal.com/>) as deputy governor responsible for social and health policies, who will have to work with the deeply entrenched local officials jealously guarding their power from outsiders and a relatively inert civil society. So far, the regional legislature has refused to confirm Gaidar in her position, citing her youthful inexperience. Other national leaders, such as Aleksandr Lebed, have faced difficulties in handling the job of governor, but Belykh has some experience, having served as a deputy governor in Perm, though that is a region that is much more progressive than Kirov.

### Yabloko Fails to Gain Prominence

Yabloko, like SPS, was once a major force in the liberal movement, but lost its parliamentary representation in the 2003 elections and failed to create an alliance with SPS or cross the 7 percent barrier on its own to win representation in the 2007 Duma elections. Although the party name originally represented the three co-founders, the party is most closely identified with Grigory Yavlinsky. Members of SPS have often blamed Yavlinsky’s unwillingness to compromise for the failure of Russia’s liberals to unite in a single coherent organization, but Yabloko supporters have frequently listed their strong ideological differences with SPS in explaining why such a merger is impossible. In June 2008, after the party had suffered consecutive humiliating electoral defeats and seemed to be stuck in a downward spiral, Yavlinsky resigned and the party elected one of his allies, Sergei Mitrokhin, to replace him. In having one clear leader, Yabloko distinguished itself from the other liberal parties since Solidarity is led by a committee of 13 individuals, while *Pravoe delo* has three co-leaders.

Under Mitrokhin the party has been much less visible than it was under Yavlinsky. Like SPS, it seems to be concentrating on regional, rather than federal, politics, though it did seek to block Putin and Medvedev’s efforts to amend the constitution to extend the presidential term from four to six years at the end of 2008. Mitrokhin, a member of the Moscow city duma and the former head of the Moscow branch of the party, has focused largely on Moscow city politics and addresses issues of concern to city residents, such as Mayor Yury Luzhkov’s construction policies. Likewise, the regional branches of the party are mainly focused on addressing regional issues, according to a recent analysis in [gazeta.ru](http://gazeta.ru).

Yabloko's decision to oppose the authorities has made it difficult for the party to operate, even in regional strongholds. Yabloko suffered a major defeat in February 2007, when St. Petersburg election officials disqualified the party from the city's legislative elections after ruling that more than 10 percent of the signatures the party had collected were invalid. Election officials often use this excuse to remove parties they do not like from elections. The three Yabloko members in the previous city legislature had voted against the appointment of Valentina Matvienko as governor and, according to Yabloko supporters, that was sufficient reason for the city authorities to target the party as undesirable.

Beyond its problems with the authorities, Yabloko's inability to work with other liberal groups continues to limit the party's ability to play a constructive role. For example, in December 2008 it excluded the head of its youth wing, Ilya Yashin, from the party ranks

because he had become one of the 13 leaders of the new Solidarity movement. Yashin went on to manage Nemtsov's campaign in Sochi. Yashin is one of the more charismatic and energetic opposition activists, as profiled in *Vedomosti* journalist Valerii Panyushkin's recent book *12 Who Do Not Agree (12 Nesoglasnykh)*, which sketches key moments in the life of a dozen prominent opposition leaders. Yashin relentlessly travels the country seeking to understand the conditions of its citizens.

### Looking Forward

Whether leaders like Nemtsov and Belykh will be able to bring change to Russia from the bottom-up remains to be seen. Much will depend on what happens at the top. However, if an opening for reform does appear, perhaps because of a split in the elite, some of the opposition liberals may be able to put their hard-won experience in campaigning and governing to good use.

#### About the author

Robert W. Orttung is a senior fellow at the Jefferson Institute and a visiting fellow at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.

#### Recommended Reading

- Kirill Benediktov, "*Soyuz pravykh sil: kratkaya istoriya partii* [Union of Right Forces: A short history of the party], Moscow: Evropa, 2009.
- Valerii Panyushkin, *12 Nesoglasnykh*, Moscow: Zakharov, 2009.
- Elfie Siegl, "Do Russian Liberals Stand a Chance?" *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 1, June 6, 2006.
- Andrew Wilson, "Does Russia Still Have an Opposition?" *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 28, October 2, 2007.
- Nikolai Petrov, "Kremlin control v grass-roots modernization," [www.opendemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net), May 8, 2009.
- Nicklaus Lavery, "Limited Choices: Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma Election," *Demokratizatsiya* 16: 4, Fall 2008, pp. 363–381.



## Analysis

## Growing Social Protest in Russia

By Tomila Lankina and Alexey Savrasov, Leicester, UK<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The number of social protests in Russia is growing, though the absolute number of participants remains relatively small. Overall, the authorities are suppressing a smaller number of protests now than they were two years ago. Political protests are more numerous than economic ones and protesters are increasingly targeting national leaders, though protests against regional leaders have increased slightly. The overall impact of the protests remains unclear.

### Are Russian Citizens Finally Stirring?

In recent months, there has been a rise in social protest activism in Russia. The most prominent instance of Putin-era social mobilization occurred in 2005 against the monetization of benefits reform, that is, when the government announced that it would scrap many benefits hitherto available to vulnerable social categories. The anti-monetization protest wave ultimately subsided following government concessions and remained a largely isolated blip in the context of oil-boom era prosperity. Then followed the 2006-2007 *Marsh nesoglasnykh* (March of Those who Disagree) protests organized by the Other Russia political opposition coalition and limited to specific regions. These protests were hailed as highly significant and as the first Putin-era instance of political mobilization and generated substantial publicity in the Russian blogosphere and the West. However, limited as they were to a handful of regions and explicitly political in nature, the *Marsh* told us little about the Russians' general willingness to defend their democratic rights through protest when it comes to issues that immediately affect their day-to-day existence.

The scope and nature of recent protest activity is therefore unprecedented. It has been triggered by the socio-economic downturn, dramatic rise in unemployment (particularly in mono-industrial towns), government incompetence in dealing with the crisis, and its populist and misguided policies.

The most prominent expression of public discontent was in Primorskiy Kray in 2008 and in the first months of 2009. The trigger to a wave of protest activism there was the national government's decision to raise import tariffs for non-Russian cars. This decision had strong implications for the financial security of large segments of the population in the Far East who depend on trade in Japanese cars. Aside from this widely publicized in-

stance of popular discontent, there have been other instances of mobilization in localities particularly hard hit by the downturn.

While there has been some isolated coverage of these events, so far there has been a dearth of systematic analyses of regional trends in protest activity. Such an analysis is highly pertinent however given the implications of these developments for Russia's political and economic development and territorial cohesion.

### The Data

We here present results of a systematic exploration of recent regional protest. The data are compiled from the opposition website associated with Garry Kasparov, [namarsh.ru](http://namarsh.ru). Data on the website are compiled based on regular dispatches from a network of regional correspondents and from press reports. Because each data entry is accompanied by a web link to press coverage of a given event, the accuracy of each entry could be verified. Although the press secretary of the *Drugaya Rossiya* (Other Russia) coalition that runs the website has assured us of the comprehensive coverage of all regional protests, we do not claim that the data are indeed comprehensive of all regional protest activism. Indeed, some regions may be over-represented because of more active web correspondents, and some regions under-represented because of the absence of correspondents or less active reporting. We do, however, believe that the data provide a reasonably accurate portrait of the *general* temporal and spatial trends in protest activism because they dovetail with public opinion poll results about those willing to take part in protest activism and actually taking to the streets and because they generally agree with analyses of the quality of the democratic process in the regions.

The website contains information on protest activity ranging from isolated, one-person protests, to large-scale mobilization involving organized political groups. Data are routinely updated by correspondents of the

<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to De Montfort University for generous funding and support for this research. Any errors are solely our own.

web-site in the regions. Our analysis covers data from 16 March 2007, when the first protest entry on the site was recorded, until 21 March 2009. In this period, the site recorded 1,783 protest acts, including those that took place despite a ban by the authorities.

The data only include activities that could be construed as genuine protests. That is, events organized by the government United Russia party or pro-government youth movements are excluded from this analysis. The dataset also contains an entry labeled “suppression” which refers to the public authorities’, the police’s, or pro-government groups’ attempts to disrupt or sabotage a protest act.

Following are the key protest categories in the dataset:

- Political – anti-government and anti-regime protests
- Economic – protests against government economic policies, such as those affecting exchange rates, salaries, etc.
- Social – protests by, and specifically furthering the aims of, socially vulnerable groups of people such as pensioners, victims of Chernobyl’, students, disabled people, people on state benefits, etc.
- Legal – protests targeting unpopular legislation, its implementation (labor, criminal, and administrative codes, etc.); protests against laws aimed at limiting political freedoms; protest against illegal acts (forced eviction, construction in inappropriate areas, etc.)
- Ecological – environmental issues, hazardous work conditions, waste dumping, destruction of forest reserves, parks, and protected woodlands.
- Cultural – protests against the destruction of monuments and of historically valuable buildings and sites; against change in city (area) names, etc.

Many protests fall into more than one category and have been coded accordingly. Thus, a protest that includes both economic and political aims would be included in the analysis of both political and economic protest dynamics.

Protest activism has been categorized by its administrative-geographic scope. Thus, protests targeting or explicitly addressed to federal authorities or the national political regime are distinguished from those targeting regional bodies or having regional scope. Protests of a sub-regional nature or targeting municipal authorities are also assigned a separate code, as are those with a more micro focus on yards (*dvor*), premises, groups of households, or buildings. Protests are also categorized by social groups that are the main organizers or participants in a protest, such as vulnerable groups; professions/in-

dustry employees (teachers, motorists, etc.); shareholders; as well as those with a combination of the various groups pursuing broader objectives. We have yet to analyze this dimension of protest and it is therefore not discussed in this report.

## Expanding Protests

Figure 1 on p. 9 maps the density of protest activism by region for the whole period analyzed. The most densely shaded regions, that is, those with the highest volume of protest activity, are Moscow, regions in the Northwest, Volga-Urals and Western Siberia, as well as the Primorskiy Kray in the Far East.

Figure 2 on p. 10, which records numbers of protests by month, illustrates the steady rise in protest activity between January 2007 and March 2009. In the Fall of 2007, the peak figure for number of participants was slightly over 40,000 people nation-wide. A year later, around the same time, over 80,000 people, or double the number, took to the streets. Figure 3 on p. 10 shows that suppression of protest activity by local, regional, or federal authorities has been declining. Thus, in June 2008, the authorities suppressed over 30 percent of protest activity, while around December–January 2008–2009, the peak figure was slightly over 25 percent. It is important to note that the peak in protest activism at both these time points is largely attributable to the same cause, namely protests against the unpopular tariffs on imported automobiles. This trend may indicate the perception by federal and regional authorities of the potentially explosive nature of suppression given that automobile tariffs affect large populations – both consumers and those involved in trade. Alternatively, it may be indicative of the much talked about liberalization under the new president Dmitry Medvedev. The contagion effect of these events may be also at work as political opportunity structures open up and more and more people are influenced by the mobilization demonstration effect in other regions. Permissiveness by authorities in some regions against the swelling ranks of protesters may provide similar signals to those in other regions.

## Politics More Important than Economics

When we disaggregate data by goals of protesters, we see (Figure 4 on p. 11) that there were more political protests than those that were purely economic in nature. Both have been on the rise. The graph in Figure 5 on p. 11 shows that there has been a slight increase in protests that are regional in scope or targeting regional authorities. By contrast, the fitted line for protests targeting national authorities indicates a more pronounced

trend for growth, with a steeper rise in protests targeting national authorities. This trend may be indicative of the general dissatisfaction with government policies. It could also be a poignant illustration of the Achilles' Heel that President Putin created in the form of governor appointments. Because governors are presidential appointees, it is the national authorities, and not the regional bodies, that people hold accountable for regional social and economic problems. Likewise, the recentralization of decision making means that governors are unwilling or unable to reverse or challenge policies that are unpopular in their regions, and, in the case of imported automobiles, those adversely affecting some regions in particular. Contrast this latter situation with the potential scenario of the US federal government banning fishing and hunting or abolishing environmentally-friendly policies, and the likely response of the governor of Alaska or California.

In terms of regional trends, Table 1, which lists the top regions in the categories of number of protests, number of protest participants, political protests, and those targeting regional and federal levels, shows that leaders in protest activism are Moscow and St. Petersburg. Other regions, which have in the past received high democracy ratings for the competitiveness of their political process, such as Samara, Sverdlovsk, Omsk and Novosibirsk are also among the top 15 regions. Conspicuously absent among regional protest leaders are the ethnically-defined republics: only Karelia, Dagestan, and Udmurtiya feature among the top 15 protesting regions. The absence of North Caucasus republics other than Dagestan among protest leaders is all the more glaring considering the known socio-economic problems in that area heavily dependent on federal handouts. These entities also have some of the lowest ratings for the competitiveness of the democratic process – both the more constraining political opportunity structures and social passivity may therefore explain this record.

Aggregate numbers of protest participants are quite modest considering that they cover data for two and a half years. Nevertheless, in such leaders as Moscow and Primorskiy Kray close to 100,000 people took to the streets in that time, with some 60 percent of all protests political in nature. The general authoritarian climate in which protests occur is also an important consideration. The government has been notorious for inventing tactics

to deal with street protests. In many regions, regional authorities have denied authorization to hold demonstrations. The opposition has in turn come up with an ingenuous way of avoiding the violation of a ban to hold a protest. Protesters often take turns standing with a poster at some prominent location. Thus, a protest may be reported as a one-man/one-woman show, while in reality it is part of an organized campaign involving anything from a handful to dozens of activists.

To summarize, protest activism has been on the rise between 2007 and 2009. Significantly, economic dissatisfaction fuelled by rising unemployment, cost of living, and quality of life issues appears to be filtering into greater political dissatisfaction with the current national political regime. While both regional and federal authorities have been blamed for the economic woes, there has been a growing tendency to target the national government in protest activism. While most regions recorded some protest activity, a handful is particularly active.

Significantly, among the most active protesting regions are Kaliningrad and Primorskiy Kray in the Far East. Kaliningrad is an exclave, geographically separated from mainland Russia with growing ties to the European Union. Recently, the Moscow Carnegie Center scholar Alexey Malashenko raised the alarming prospect of Russia's disintegration, suggesting that Kaliningrad would be the first region to go considering its geographic location and links to Europe. At the same time, the intensity of protest against automobile import tariffs in Primorskiy Kray has forcefully demonstrated just how deeply the region's economy is orientated to, and dependent on, the Far Eastern countries, most notably Japan. It is noteworthy that while the Spring 2007 *Marsh* participants in St. Petersburg raised a banner of the European Union, those protesting in the Far East sported giant banners that read "Russia doesn't need us?" and "Give *Vladik* and Kurily [Vladivostok and Kuril Islands] to Japan!" As the economic crisis in Russia deepens, social and political protest is unlikely to subside. In the most optimistic scenario popular discontent would force national level political and economic reform. In the less optimistic scenario, these developments would threaten the country's territorial cohesion.

*Information about the authors and suggested reading overleaf.*



#### About the authors

Tomila Lankina is a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Public Policy and Alexey Savrasov is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Human Resources Management at De Montfort University in Leicester, UK.


#### Suggested Reading

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- Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Natalya Zubarevich, "Sovremennoye prostranstvo Rossii: Chelovecheskoye izmereniye," *Demoscope weekly*, 2005.

## Statistics

### Social Protest in Russia 2007–2009 in Figures

Figure 1: Density (Number) of Protests by Region, March 2007–March 2009



Source: map generated on <http://www.sci.aha.ru> using data compiled by Tomila Lankina and Alexey Savrasov

Figure 2: Number of People Participating





Figure 3: Suppression of Protest



Source: data compiled by Tomila Lankina and Alexey Savrasov

Figure 4: Political and Economic Protests





Figure 5: Protest Against Central and Regional Government Bodies



Source: data compiled by Tomila Lankina and Alexey Savrasov

**Table 1: Top 15 Protesting Regions in Key Protest Categories**

	Number of protests	Number of participants	Number of political protests	Number of protests targeting national level	Number of protests targeting regional level	Share of protests suppressed
1	Moscow City	Moscow City	Moscow City	Moscow City	Moscow City	Moscow City
2	St. Petersburg	Primorskiy	St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg
3	Samara	St. Petersburg	Sverdlovsk	Samara	Penza	Samara
4	Sverdlovsk	Volgograd	Samara	Sverdlovsk	Kaliningrad	Penza
5	Penza	Voronezh	Penza	Kirov	Samara	Omsk
6	Kirov	Samara	Primorskiy	Primorskiy	Udmurtiya	Sverdlovsk
7	Kaliningrad	Udmurtiya	Kirov	Penza	Moscow Oblast	Kirov
8	Primorskiy	Sverdlovsk	Kaliningrad	Kaliningrad	Tambov	Nizhegorodskaya
9	Moscow Oblast	Arkhangelsk	Omsk	Pskov	Dagestan	Orenburg
10	Ulyanovsk	Krasnodar	Ulyanovsk	Voronezh	Ryazan	Moscow Oblast
11	Omsk	Kirov	Voronezh	Omsk	Ulyanovsk	Primorskiy
12	Ryazan	Novosibirsk	Pskov	Tambov	Irkutsk	Dagestan
13	Tambov	Kaliningrad	Udmurtiya	Murmansk	Omsk	Perm
14	Voronezh	Penza	Moscow Oblast	Ryazan	Sverdlovsk	Ryazan
15	Novosibirsk	Karelia	Mordovia	Mordovia	Kirov	Ulyanovsk

**Table 2: Top 15 Protesting Regions by Number of Protests**

Region	Number of Protests	Number of People participating	% Political	Organized by Political Parties	% National level	% Suppression	Regional %
Moscow City	492	93213	62.60%	37.40%	61.99%	30.08%	5.49%
St. Petersburg	240	34070	44.17%	31.67%	43.75%	24.58%	9.17%
Samara	76	13392	38.16%	14.47%	46.05%	19.74%	14.47%
Sverdlovsk	56	10988	55.36%	32.14%	50.00%	21.43%	10.71%
Penza	54	5875	46.30%	12.96%	27.78%	25.93%	31.48%
Kirov	45	8114	51.11%	46.67%	60.00%	24.44%	13.33%
Kaliningrad	40	6490	50.00%	15.00%	37.50%	15.00%	32.50%
Primorskiy	40	89670	60.00%	10.00%	65.00%	20.00%	12.50%
Moscow Oblast	33	4855	45.45%	18.18%	18.18%	27.27%	30.30%
Ulyanovsk	32	2099	53.13%	31.25%	28.13%	21.88%	25.00%
Omsk	31	1036	61.29%	41.94%	41.94%	38.71%	19.35%
Ryazan	29	1566	44.83%	41.38%	37.93%	24.14%	27.59%
Tambov	28	770	50.00%	39.29%	46.43%	10.71%	32.14%
Voronezh	28	16192	57.14%	32.14%	50.00%	10.71%	10.71%
Novosibirsk	26	6903	34.62%	19.23%	34.62%	15.38%	15.38%

Source: data compiled by Tomila Lankina and Alexey Savrasov

## Analysis

# Fascist Tendencies in Russia's Political Establishment: The Rise of the International Eurasian Movement

By Andreas Umland, Eichstaett, Bavaria

## Abstract

Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent advocate of fascist and anti-Western views, has risen from a fringe ideologue to deeply penetrate into Russian governmental offices, mass media, civil society and academia in ways that many in the West do not realize or understand. Prominent members of Russian society are affiliated with his International Eurasian Movement. Among Dugin's most important collaborators are electronic and print media commentator Mikhail Leont'ev and the legendary TV producer and PR specialist Ivan Demidov. If Dugin's views become more widely accepted, a new Cold War will be the least that the West should expect from Russia during the coming years.

## The Rise of Aleksandr Dugin

In recent years, various forms of nationalism have become a part of everyday Russian political and social life. Since the end of the 1990s, an increasingly aggressive racist sub-culture has been infecting sections of Russia's youth, and become the topic of numerous analyses by Russian and non-Russian observers. Several new radical right-wing organizations, like the Movement Against Illegal Emigration, known by its Russian acronym DPNI, have attracted extensive attention from domestic and foreign journalists, scholars and monitors. Parallel tendencies within Russian intellectual life, in contrast, have received less national and international notice although their repercussions can increasingly be felt in the political thinking and behavior of Moscow's rulers. It is generally acknowledged that a shrill anti-Americanism, as well as various other phobias, today characterize not only marginal groups, but also the Russian mainstream. However, in many analyses, the sources of, and channels for, such tendencies in Russia's elite strata remain obscure.

Among the dozens of extremely anti-Western publicists and pundits present in Russian official and public life today, Aleksandr Dugin and his various followers stand out as a network of especially industrious political ideologues and activists who have managed to penetrate Russian governmental offices, mass media, civil society and academia. Dugin's bizarre ideas have been analyzed in dozens of scholarly and journalistic texts (see the Suggested Reading at the end of this article). At the same time, instead of being treated as a political phenomenon, the Duginists are sometimes presented as peculiarly post-Soviet curiosities. Occasionally, they are used to illustrate the degree of Russia's confusion after the collapse of its empire rather than perceived as engines of broader trends in contemporary Russian dis-

course that must be taken seriously. Dugin's numerous links to the political and academic establishments of a number of post-Soviet countries, as well as institutions in Turkey, remain understudied or misrepresented. In other cases, Dugin and his followers receive more serious attention, yet are still portrayed as anachronistic, backward-looking imperialists – merely a particularly radical form of contemporary Russian anti-globalism. Many such assessments downplay the manifest neo-fascism of Dugin's bellicose ideology. Neither the stunning public appeal nor the grave political implications of Duginism are well-understood in Russia or the West today.

## The Members of the Supreme Council of the International Eurasian Movement

A marginal conspiracy theorist in the 1990s, Dugin has, during the last 10 years, become a respected commentator and writer on contemporary world affairs, in general, and Russia's foreign policy, in particular. This has happened in spite of his frank praise of the *SS Ahnenerbe* institute (Heritage of the Forefathers), enthusiastic prophecy of a Russian "fascist fascism," and numerous similar statements during the early and mid-1990s. Dugin's rise began in 1998 when then State Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznyov, a leader of the Communist Party, appointed him as an advisor. Dugin's unexpected appearance as an official employee of the presidium of the parliament's lower house marked the radical rightist's break-through from the lunatic fringe into the political establishment of the Russian Federation (RF). Since then, Dugin's presence and weight in Russian political and academic life has only grown.

Since its foundation as the Socio-Political Movement "Eurasia" in 2001, Dugin's main orga-



nization, the *Mezhdunarodnoe "Evraziiskoe dvizhenie"* (MED; International Eurasian Movement), has included a number of high-ranking government officials, such as:

- former RF Minister of Culture Aleksandr Sokolov,
- Chairman of the Federation Council's Committee on International Relations Mikhail Margelov,
- former advisor to President Yeltsin and RF Ambassador to Denmark Dmitrii Riurikov,
- former Head of the RF Ministry of Justice Department on Political Parties and Social Organizations Aleksei Zhafiarov, and others.

While these figures are today no longer listed on the MED's website (<http://evrazia.info/>), and may have cut their ties with Dugin, the MED still boasts a number of prominent personalities as members of its Supreme Council. They included in early April 2009:

- Federation Council Vice-Speaker Aleksandr Torshin,
- Presidential advisor Aslambek Aslakhanov,
- South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoity,
- *Odnako* (However) TV show host and editor-in-chief of the weekly political journal *Profil'* (Profile) Mikhail Leont'ev,
- former Deputy Foreign Minister and current RF Ambassador to Latvia Viktor Kaliuzhnyi,
- Yakutiia (Sakha) Minister of Culture and Rector of the Arctic State Institute of Culture and Art, Andrei Borisov,
- Head of the RF Territorial Directorate's State Committee for Property responsible for Moscow State University Zeidula Iuzbekov,
- Chief Mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Russia and European Countries of the C.I.S. Talgat Tadzhuddin,
- President of the National Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters and member of the Directorate of the Academy of Russian Television Eduard Sagalaev,
- Head of the RF Council of Ambassadors and President of the Russian-Turkish Friendship Society "Rutam" Al'bert Chernyshov,
- Editor-in-Chief of the Russian army newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star) Nikolai Efimov,
- President of the Consulting Firm *Neokon* and founder of the website *Worldcrisis.ru* Mikhail Khazin,
- Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Vice-President of the Society of Georgians of Russia Severian Zagarishvili,

- Head of the Congress of the Peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Secretary for National Issues of the Union of Writers of Russia Brontoi Bediurov.

In addition, the MED's Supreme Council contains political and academic functionaries from various CIS countries. Among them were, in early April 2009, the:

- Rector of the Lev Gumilyov Eurasian National University of Astana (Kazakhstan) Sarsyngali Abdymanapov,
- Ambassador of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Head of the Council of Directors of *Postnoff Ltd* Apas Dzhumagulov,
- Director of the Academy of Management attached to the Office of the President of Belarus and Director of the Research Institute on the Theory and Practice of Government of the Republic of Belarus Evgenii Matusevich,
- Rector of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University of Bishkek Vladimir Nifad'ev,
- Director of the Akhmad Donish Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Tajik Academy of Sciences Rakhim Masov,
- Rector of the Makhambet Utemisov Western Kazakhstani State University of Uralsk Tuiakbai Ryzbekov,
- Leader of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine Nataliia Vitrenko,

Finally, it is noteworthy that a number of public figures from countries outside the former Soviet Union have, according to MED's website, also agreed to enter the Supreme Council of the International Eurasian Movement. They include the

- Head of the *İşçi Partisi* (Labour Party) of Turkey Doğu Perinçek (currently in prison),
- French Air Force General (ret.) and leader of the Forum for France Pierre-Marie Gallois,
- Director of the Center for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies at Luleå, Sweden, and Editor-in-Chief of the scholarly journal *Central Asia and the Caucasus* Murad Esenov,
- Lecturer of the Faculty of Policy Studies of Iwate Prefectural University, Japan, Iukiko Kuroiwa,
- conspirologist and author of the book *Vladimir Poutine et l'Eurasie* (Charmes: Les Amis de la Culture Européenne, 2005), Jean Parvulesco,
- Editor-in-Chief of the Milano journal *Eurasia: Rivista di Studi Geopolitici* (of which Dugin is an editorial board member) Tiberio Graziani,
- Head of the Congress of Serbs of Eurasia (KSEA) Mila Alečković-Nikolić, and

- General (ret.) and former functionary of the Serbian Radical Party Božidar Delić.

### Dugin's Public References to Fascism

While the ties linking some of these figures to Dugin are obvious, the reasons for the MED affiliation of others listed here remain a mystery. As indicated, throughout the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly eulogized, in disguised or open form, inter-war European and contemporary Russian fascism (sometimes, under his pseudonym as a poet "Aleksandr Sternberg," he did so in rhymes!). The most explicit apologies for fascism can be found in Dugin's programmatic articles "Left Nationalism" (1992) or "Fascism – Borderless and Red" (1997) which are, as of April 2009, still openly accessible on the MED leader's official web sites <http://arcto.ru/> and <http://my.arcto.ru/>. Moreover, a number of these articles from the 1990s are, by now, available in Western languages. Some of them have been repeatedly quoted, in Russian and English language scholarly and journalistic analyses of Dugin and his movement.

To be sure, Dugin has, for obvious reasons, been eager to disassociate himself from German Nazism, at times strongly condemning Hitler's crimes, and now often introduces himself as an "anti-fascist." Yet, at certain points, he seemingly could not help but acknowledge the relevance of, above all other regimes, the Third Reich as a model for his own ideological constructs, like for instance, in his seminal analyses "Conservative Revolution: The Third Way" (1991) or "The Metaphysics of National Bolshevism" (1997) at <http://my.arcto.ru/>. As late as March 2006, at a point when he was already a full member of Moscow's political establishment, Dugin, in a KM.ru online conference, publicly admitted that his ideology is close to that of the inter-war German brothers Otto and Gregor Strasser. In that interview, the transcript of which was re-produced on MED's website, Dugin introduced the Strasser brothers as belonging to the anti-Hitler branch of German left-wing nationalism. Dugin, however, "forgot" to mention that the Strassers were once themselves National Socialists and played an important role in the rise of the Nazi party (NSDAP), in the late 1920s. They subsequently indeed opposed Adolf Hitler, but did so first *within* the Nazi party. Gregor Strasser's one-time personal secretary, Joseph Goebbels, in spite of his once also "left-wing" inclinations, went on – as is all too well-known – to become one of Hitler's closest associates. Today, Strasserism is an important branch within the world wide network of neo-Nazi groupuscules – a pan-national movement to which Dugin,

in view of his stated closeness to the Strassers, would seem to belong.

### Mikhail Leont'ev and Ivan Demidov as Dugin's Accomplices

Normally, such details would be sufficient for serious students of international security to dismiss this figure and his organization as objects worthy of deeper political analysis. Dugin and Co., it would appear, are phenomena better left to the scrutiny of cultural anthropologists, psychopathologists, sociologists, or, at best, historians of current affairs. Yet, as illustrated by the list of former and current MED Supreme Council members, Dugin is, by now, firmly located within the mainstream of Russian political and intellectual life. He publishes in major newspapers and is regularly invited to top-notch political and academic round-tables and conferences.

Among Dugin's most important collaborators is electronic and print media commentator Mikhail Leont'ev. Once called Vladimir Putin's "favourite journalist," Leont'ev officially entered the Supreme Council of the MED only recently, although he had participated in the foundation congress of Dugin's movement in 2001, after which he was also briefly listed as a member of the organization's leadership on Dugin's website. Since then, Leont'ev has provided for Dugin, numerous times, a mass audience by letting the MED leader present his views on prime time television shows broadcast by Russia's First Channel. One of Russia's most well-known propagandists of anti-Americanism, Leont'ev's frequent tirades against the West, in general, and the US, in particular, are obviously informed by Dugin's Manichean schemes. To be sure, Dugin himself appeals to an only limited circle of political activists and young intellectuals. Via television shows like Leont'ev's *Odnako*, an encrypted and somewhat softer from of Duginism, however, reaches much of Russia's population on an almost daily basis.

Another consequential figure with unofficial, but apparently equally close ties to Dugin is the legendary TV producer and PR specialist Ivan Demidov. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, Demidov worked on national television and became famous for his participation in a number of popular TV projects like *Vzgliad* (View) or *Muzoboz* (Music Cart). At that time, he appeared, like Leont'ev in his early years, to be a representative of the new generation of anti-Soviet young, Westernizing media figures who helped to emancipate Russian public discourse. In the new century, Demidov's profile, however, changed as he became the anchorman of one of Russia's most brazenly nationalistic TV shows

*Russkii vzgliad* (The Russian View) shown weekly on the *Moskovia* (Muscovy) Channel. In 2005, Demidov was one of the co-founders of the new nationalist cable channel *Spas* (Saviour), where he provided Dugin with his own show called *Vekhi* (Landmarks). In the same year, Demidov became a politician when – allegedly, upon the request of Vladimir Putin – he was named leader of United Russia’s official youth organization *Molodaia gvardiia* (Young Guard). He also directed the so-called “Russian Project” of United Russia – an attempt to attract ethnocentric Russian youth and intellectuals to Putin’s regime. In 2008, Demidov was promoted to be the head of the Ideology Section of the Political Department of United Russia’s Executive Committee, i.e. Putin’s party’s chief ideologist. A few months earlier, Demidov had, in an interview for Dugin’s website *Evrazia.org*, admitted that Dugin’s appearance was a “deciding factor, a sort of breaking point” in his life, and that he wants to use his talents to implement Dugin’s ideas. Demidov called himself, with explicit reference to these ideas, a “convinced Eurasian.” Oddly, this is the same phrase with which, fifteen years earlier, Dugin had, in the original version of his seminal article “The Great War of the Continents” (1991–1992, <http://my.arcto.ru/>), characterized *SS-Obergruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich – the Holocaust’s chief early organizer (the phrase was deleted in later editions of that article). In March 2009, Demidov was promoted to be the Head of the Department for Humanitarian Policies and Public Relations of the Domestic Politics Directorate of the RF Presidential Administration. In this function, Demidov will have special responsibility for the president’s relations with religious organizations, i.e., above all, with the Russian Orthodox Church.

### The Mimicry Tactics of the “Neo-Eurasianists”

Dugin himself recently managed to make further inroads into Russian public life. In 2008, he was appointed professor in the Sociology Department of Moscow’s renowned Lomonosov University (MGU) where he now directs the Center for Conservative Studies. This promotion is an important step in Dugin’s further penetration of the mainstream since it provides him with a respected title and prestigious site for conferences and

other meetings. Dugin’s active use of the term “conservatism” also continues his earlier strategy of camouflaging his doctrine with terminology that fits Russian and international political correctness. While at the fringe of Russia’s political life, in the early-mid 1990s, Dugin described his own ideology frankly as a program of the “Conservative Revolution,” a construct he explicitly used to define fascism, or as “National Bolshevism” – a Russian version of National Socialism as the colors of the flag of the National Bolshevik Party, which Dugin co-founded in 1994, suggested. When he started drawing closer to the establishment, however, Dugin put more emphasis on labels like “Eurasian” or “Traditionalist” although his “neo-Eurasianist” ideology, in important regards, sharply diverges from both classical Eurasianism and Integral Traditionalism. Today, Dugin poses front-stage as a proponent of “conservatism” while his back-stage agenda is still unabashedly revolutionary. The success of Dugin’s and his supporters’ tactic of political mimicry was recently illustrated when one of the activists of Dugin’s youth organization, *Evraziiskii soiuz molodezhyi* (Eurasian Movement of the Young), the artist Aleksei Beliaev-Gintovt was awarded *Deutsche Bank*’s Kandinsky Prize (in view of the rather different styles of Kandinsky’s art and Beliaev-Gintovt’s paintings – an odd choice, in any way). That one of their supporters won the prestigious German award was proudly presented by Dugin’s organizations as another confirmation of the substance and seriousness of their intellectual project.

In view of the depth and multifariousness of Dugin’s connections into Russia’s highest political and cultural echelons, it is difficult to imagine how his current influence could be limited, or, at least, his future advance contained. At the same time, Dugin’s recent political words and deeds indicate that, in comparison to his openly fascist phase in the early and mid-1990s, today only his terminology and public behavior, but not his ideology and aims, have fundamentally changed. Should Dugin and his followers succeed in further extending their reach into Russian politics and society at large, a new Cold War will be the least that the West should expect from Russia during the coming years.

*Information about the authors and suggested reading overleaf.*

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*Suggested Reading*

- Galina Kozhevnikova in collaboration with Alexander Verkhovsky and Eugene Veklerov, *Ultra-Nationalism and Hate Crimes in Contemporary Russia: The 2004–2006 Annual Reports of Moscow's SOVA Center*. With a foreword by Stephen D. Shenfield (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 77). Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag 2005.
- Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*. Translated by Mischa Gabowitsch (Baltimore and Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2008).
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- Anastasia Mitrofanova, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas*. With a foreword by William C. Gay (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 13). Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag 2005.
- Andreas Umland, ed., *Theorizing Post-Soviet Russia's Extreme Right: Comparative Political, Historical and Sociological Approaches* (Russian Politics and Law 46:4). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2008.
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## About the Russian Analytical Digest

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Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the former socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist countries, since January 2007 a group of international research institutes is participating in a collaborative project on the theme "The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in culture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history", which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU governance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email service with nearly 20,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute's library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in data bases.

## The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public.

The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center's research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

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